Masculinity as Governance: police, public service and the embodiment of authority, c. 1700-1850 by Dodsworth, Francis
Open Research Online
The Open University’s repository of research publications
and other research outputs
Masculinity as Governance: police, public service and
the embodiment of authority, c. 1700-1850
Book Chapter
How to cite:
Dodsworth, Francis (2007). Masculinity as Governance: police, public service and the embodiment of
authority, c. 1700-1850. In: McCormack, Matthew ed. Public men: political masculinities in modern Britain.
UK: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 33–53.
For guidance on citations see FAQs.
c© [not recorded]
Version: [not recorded]
Link(s) to article on publisher’s website:
http://www.palgrave-usa.com/catalog/product.aspx?isbn=0230007635
Copyright and Moral Rights for the articles on this site are retained by the individual authors and/or other copy-





Masculinity as Governance: Police, Public Service and the Embodiment of 
Authority, c. 1700-18501 
 
Policing has traditionally been considered as a masculine task, which has had 
significant and often detrimental consequences for the introduction and reception of 
women into police forces and the nature and practice of the police role more 
generally.2 It is commonly assumed that the link between masculinity and policing is 
a ‘natural’ one, related to the physical nature of the tasks central to police work. In 
this chapter I argue that the link between masculinity and policing emerged not 
simply because it was a natural association in a job that was physically arduous and 
often dangerous, but because there is also a long-standing link between a certain 
vision of manly independence and public, civil authority in British political discourse. 
This was particularly important in the legitimization of a new form of institutional 
policing in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries when the traditional 
system of police based on the rotation of unpaid offices amongst local gentlemen was 
replaced with a paid, hierarchical alternative staffed by men of lower social status.3 
In focusing on the relationship between masculinity, government and 
institutionalization in this period I want to say something broader about the 
emergence and nature of ‘bureaucracy’ as it applies to policing and its relation to the 
system of rule that preceded it, as well as pointing to the relatively unexplored links 
between institutional form and politics. There is a tendency in much historical work to 
see the emergence of hierarchical, bureaucratic government as a process of 
‘modernization’ or increasing government rationalization. It should be clear from this 
chapter that rather than replacing a ‘customary’ system based on symbolic values with 
one based around reason in many senses the creation of policing organizations seems 
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to have been a way of institutionalizing the governmental values of the old order, 
particularly that of manly independence.4 
Here I demonstrate the centrality and persistence of particular conceptions of 
character and capacity to late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century ideas of 
government: the possession of masculine independence conferred authority and the 
right to govern others. For a community to be self-governing, and thus free, it was 
understood to require the presence and activity of a particular kind of public man; to 
be such a public man required the possession of a certain kind of manly 
independence. Traditionally it was hoped that the independence, commitment, 
courage and judgement required of the governor to exercise civil authority would be 
cultivated in the gentry through their education, which would imbue them with 
sufficient sense of civic duty to participate actively in the government of their 
community. This was defined as an obligation, the gentry having a duty to care for 
their dependents, but also as a right, the capacity to participate setting them apart from 
the common man and fulfilling their patrician persona. But in practice this duty to 
govern was often ignored and communities were faced with deputies who could in no 
sense be said to embody the patrician values idealised for the governor: they therefore 
devised mechanisms to regulate and secure the values they understood to be 
important. This included securing a certain level of physical presence in the men and 
in the process the transformation of police masculinity. In doing so the authorities 
responsible for policing were using particular conceptions of masculinity 
programmatically and politically to legitimize the activity of some men, not usually 




In this examination of the construction of police authority through masculinity 
I explore the ways in which police officers were defined discursively, but also created 
through selection and discipline in order to fashion men who embodied the dominant 
values of authority understood by the police authorities to be necessary to make them 
acceptable in the dominant political culture and feared by the ‘lower orders’. In doing 
so I am greatly indebted to Wilbur Miller’s excellent comparison between policing in 
London and New York. Miller quite correctly identifies the importance of creating 
authority by counteracting accusations of French-style militarism, Executive power 
and a standing army through the promotion of political independence and impartiality 
in the Metropolitan Police and he links this explicitly to the institutional form of the 
force.5 But since Miller wrote this pioneering study there have been several 
developments in the study of police history which make it clear that many of the 
practices used by the Metropolitan police pre-existed their formation and were not 
unique to them: they therefore require re-assessment.6 Inevitably, given the lack of 
knowledge of the subject at the time of writing, there is no sense in Miller’s work of 
any relationship between the ‘new’ police and the old. Equally, while militarism and 
Executive power were major fears surrounding Home Office control over London’s 
policing, this does not explain why these strategies were used in forces that were 
unconnected to central government both before and after the Metropolitan Police Act 
of 1829, nor does Miller demonstrate how the specific dynamic of that debate related 
to the construction of a particular notion of the constable as civic official. In order to 
achieve this re-assessment of the subject I explore policing in places and periods 
unrelated to the question of Executive control of the Metropolitan police, in particular 
the period before their establishment in London and elsewhere, through the definition 
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of the office of constable in the handbooks available throughout the country, and in 




It is now well established that the central political problematic in eighteenth-century 
British political thought was how to maintain liberty, envisioned in neo-classical 
terms, in the context of the emergence of commercial society.7 According to the 
Machiavellian cyclical vision of history states achieved their freedom through wealth 
and martial vigour, which enabled them to triumph over their rivals and through the 
disinterested public spirit or virtù of the political class: their devotion to the common 
good ensured that they would be vigilant against attempts to divide the country into 
factions or draw the state or the government into dependence on any one individual, 
which would lead to dictatorship. Matthew McCormack has demonstrated how this 
became manifest in English political culture in the specific value of independence.8 
But although the significance of the Machiavellian imagination is now clear in the 
history of political argument, there has been little research into the relationship 
between neo-classical political thought and the conceptualization and practice of 
government.  
Just as corruption and negligence were at the heart of fears about the operation 
of the political system, so were they central to understandings of the social order. 
From the Glorious Revolution right up to the 1780s and beyond it was consistently 
argued that England or Britain could not remain free as long as the population were 
mired in corruption: ‘no Degree of Wealth, of Trade, of naval or Military Force, have 
ever been sufficient to support any Nation where Luxury and Vice have prevailed, but 
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on the contrary the greatest Empires in all Ages have sunk before them’.9 The 
manners of the people, then, were as important to the preservation of liberty as a good 
constitution, meaning ‘unless there is a general Disposition in the Body of the People, 
to co-operate with the Magistrate in the Suppression of Vice and Immorality; and in 
the Execution of the Laws against publick Offenders, that it is out of the Power of any 
human Legislature, to contrive Laws, that can make People honest, happy, or free’.10 
Often combining classical and Christian elements it was argued that the nation was 
liable either to divine retribution or simply to sink into neglect of virtue through 
luxury and vice. As one author put it, ‘we are in the present Age arrived to an Excess 
in that Vice [luxury] beyond all the past, from which the greatest Danger may be 
feared to the State, both, on Account of the natural Consequences of that Vice itself 
… or the Vengeance it is likely to bring on us from the Hand of Heaven’.11 Numerous 
biblical and classical examples were brought out to demonstrate the rise and fall of 
states through the growth of luxury, irreligion and vice.12 This danger, it must be 
recalled, was a very real one in the context of the recent Jacobite rebellion of 1745, 
which held out the distinct possibility of civil war or conquest by France.13 The 
solution was to govern public morality, which was the task of the magistrate, the 
constable and his assistants (beadles watchmen and so on). 
The maintenance of the free state, then, depended upon the activity of a 
particular kind of public man whose duty it was to maintain good order. Without the 
activity of the public spirited gentleman Britain faced two alternatives: either living as 
‘Bond-Slaves to Vice, Luxury, and all Degrees of Wickedness’ or ‘employing such a 
force of Guards and Garrisons as must reduce us to a military Form of Government, 
and leave us entirely at the Mercy of arbitrary Power’, ‘Slaves to a military Force’.14 
These sentiments were echoed by Saunders Welch who served actively as High 
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Constable of Holborn in the 1740s and 50s: ‘what must become of the civil policy of 
this country, if men called upon to execute this office are brought to be either 
ashamed, or afraid, to do their duty?’ Laws are nothing, he writes, without the activity 
and integrity of the executive officers, the negligence of whom ‘reduces the very best 
constitutions to a mere dead letter; and must soon produce that intolerable anarchy, 
which can alone drive the honest part of mankind to fly to a military force, to a 
miserable refuge from a still worse evil’.15 This opposition between surrendering 
one’s liberty to vice and crime or surrendering it to a military force, argues the author 
of The Vices of the Cities of London and Westminster, stems from a mistaken 
unwillingness to serve as a peace officer, which is founded upon the false idea that 
there exists a distinction between men and the government and in particular between 
their interests. In contrast, the author argues that ‘a wise Man, so happy to be a 
Subject of Great-Britain, ought to know, that the Government and the People, the 
Legislature and He are truly the same Thing, that it’s impossible to divide them either 
in Nature or Interests; that he himself is a Part of the Government’.16 This represents a 
neo-classical conception of government, whereby the foundation of national liberty 
lies on a community of self-governing citizens, who gain their freedom by engaging 
in government themselves. It was a man’s duty as a subject and a Christian to bring 
all offenders before the law: to fail to do so was ‘foolish, effeminate Compassion’. 
Effeminacy, of course, was closely related to the corruption that led to unfreedom, 
which was by nature feminine and opposed to the masculine vitality of the healthy 
body politic.17 Masculinity, then, defines the exercise of authority and underpins 
liberty. The author goes on to argue for greater care in the choice of constables, the 
augmentation of the watch and the use of informers.18 
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The kind of manly virtue required for controlling the spread of vice and 
corruption through the body politic was defined in the conduct manuals provided for 
constables and other parish officers. Before the late eighteenth century service as a 
peace officer was seen as a public duty and was rotated amongst the men of the 
community: service was unpaid and obligatory, with fines for refusal. Constabulary 
duty was defined in terms of service to the commonwealth,19 that is the common good 
or res publica and police officers were chosen, depending upon local custom and the 
seniority of the office, either by the men being selected by the Justice of the Peace or 
more commonly being elected at the Court Leet or parish council, otherwise the 
offices were simply rotated regularly amongst the owners of property in the area. The 
tasks of the constable were to keep the peace, raise and organise the hue and cry if an 
offence had been committed, pursue offenders reported to them by the victims of 
crime, maintain public morality and organise the nightly watch. As Ritson put it ‘the 
commonwealth consists in the well-ordering of particular towns, and order will not be 
well observed in them but where the officers are idonei’, i.e. ‘fit men’ for the 
execution of that duty.20 
From the early seventeenth century the duties of these constables and other 
police officers were laid out in various handbooks which served as guides for their 
conduct and the basis of their legal authority. Later commentators on these offices 
drew heavily upon these definitions in a legal system based on custom and precedent. 
In 1610 Francis Bacon argued that ‘the petty constables in town ought to be of the 
better sort of resiants [sic] of the said town, save that they ought not to be aged or 
sickly men, but men of able bodies in respect of the keeping watch, and toil of their 
places’, ‘Neither ought they to be in any man’s livery’. Bacon’s words were excerpted 
for the prospective eighteenth-century constable in Jacob’s Complete Parish Officer 
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and were repeated verbatim in Ritson’s The Office of Constable.21 The petty 
constables, the chief ‘peace officers’ for the parish or the tything, were to be men of 
property who lived in the area they held jurisdiction over, so that the community 
could be said to be governing itself and they had an interest in its government. They 
should be physically capable of what was often a dangerous and demanding task and, 
crucially, they should not be servants to anyone so that they were not subject to the 
will of their master, rather they were independent men capable of acting according to 
their own will and judgement. The high constables, that is the constables who had no 
greater powers, but jurisdiction over the much greater area of the whole Hundred, 
‘ought to be of the ablest of freeholders, and of the most substantial sort of yeoman, 
next to the degree of gentlemen’.22 By the mid-eighteenth century the Fielding 
brothers, active agents in the government of order through their Bow Street Police 
Office, were clearly defining theses officers as either gentlemen or yeomen.23 
According to Patrick Colquhoun, one of the stipendiary magistrates introduced under 
the 1792 Middlesex Justices Act, traditional constables should be freemen, the classic 
propertied independent man of eighteenth-century political culture considered as one 
with the capacity to act as a free agent in politics.24 
In 1630 the King issued a directive that constables should be ‘fit men’.25 But 
what did it mean to be a ‘fit man’, or idoneus homo? Despite several disagreements 
about the origin of the office of constable, closely related to the political settlements 
of the Commonwealth and the Restoration, the definition of the ‘fit man’ remained 
relatively constant. First, in this context, was the specific exclusion of women from 
the office: ‘The party chosen, as hee must bee a lay person, so hee must bee a lay 
man, not a Lay-woman, & therefore a widowe or maid, albeit she keep house of her 
selfe, and dwell in a house whose owner hath been used to serve in this office, is not 
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to be chosen to this Office’; even in districts where the office was rotated amongst the 
different properties women were specifically excluded from the role.26 The popular 
eighteenth-century guide The Compleat Constable argued against the rotation of the 
office amongst properties for this very reason ‘for so it may fall upon a Woman 
(which is not sufferable) but it may be a good Custom, that every Man sufficiently 
qualified, shall serve or find one to do it’. Women, either maids or widows, were 
again specifically excluded, despite the fact that widows could inherit the property of 
their husbands. The later Complete Parish Officer stipulated that ‘if the office happen 
on a woman, where there is a custom for every inhabitant to serve by turns, she may 
hire one to execute the office’.27 Likewise ‘as hee must be a man, so must he be 
idoneus homo, i.e. a fit man, & that first for his knowledge, that he doth in some good 
measure understand what he doth & ought to do. And therefore a man that is non 
compus mentis, as an Ideot or mad man, an Infant, or the like, cannot bee a fit man’: 
the constable had to be capable of rational and independent thought, capacities 
traditionally and legally only granted to adult men.28 The Compleat Constable linked 
together women, madmen, children and old men as they lacked the material and 
mental capacity to act without being swayed by the opinions or wealth of anyone else, 
or did not possess the physical capacity to carry out all the necessary tasks.29  
Possession of the mental and physical capacity to carry out the duty of a peace 
officer was only one aspect of the qualifications provided by masculine independence, 
which also provided the financial security and moral probity necessary to carry out a 
public trust without payment. The constable ‘must bee fit for his honestie, that he may 
be likely to execute his office truely without ill affection or partiality, and therefore it 
seemes a scandalous liver, a malicious and contentious man cannot bee a fit man’: the 
most important stipulation here is that the constable must not be partial or malicious 
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in his office, he must discharge his duty dispassionately and fairly but it is also 
notable that he must act morally himself in order to exercise moral authority over 
others.30 In addition ‘Hee must bee fit for his abilitie of Body and Estate. And 
therefore an old, weake, sick, or otherwise, impotent man; or a poore needy man that 
lives only by his labour, cannot bee a fit man’: being fit in body and estate meant that 
not only was the constable physically capable of the task, but that he was rendered 
independent by his property, both in terms of time and resources, so that he did not 
rely on the patronage of others and would not neglect the office to carry out his own 
work.31 As The Compleat Constable put it ‘This Office ought not to be put on the 
poorer sort, for they are usually most ignorant and fearful, and less able to attend this 
Office, their Necessity requiring them to maintain their own Trade and Employment: 
And ’tis to be understood, that Constables have no Allowance, but are bound to 
perform their Office gratis’.32 In addition, the poor could be unable or unwilling to 
attend to the duties of a constable, because they were either ‘ignorant what they may 
and should do, or are over-awed by their richer Neighbours, so as for fear to balk their 
Duties’.33 Those serving should not do so simply where they owned property, but 
wherever they had their residence in order to give them a direct interest in the 
community they served, but also to ensure that community governed itself, rather than 
being governed.34 These principles, phrases and definitions were repeated almost 
verbatim in most constables’ handbooks from the Restoration to Waterloo.  
This constitutes a system whereby the authority of the constable depended 
upon his social and physical status. In the social-governmental hierarchy of the 
eighteenth century the petty constable fell into place below the aristocrats who acted 
as Lord Lieutenant and their immediate inferiors the Lords of the Manor and higher 
ranks of the gentry who filled the offices of Sheriff and Justice of the Peace, but 
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significantly above the ‘commonalty’. Jonas Hanway, lamenting the decline of the 
office, argued that the constable should be drawn from ‘the valuable equestrian order 
of men’, that is the country gentleman worth between £500 and £1000 a year.35 The 
term ‘equestrian’ explicitly links the constabulary duty of the British gentry to a 
Roman conception of civic virtue. The possession of manly, propertied independence 
gave the constable the courage and sturdiness to carry out the dangerous and difficult 
tasks of pursuit and arrest. It also meant that he did not have pressing tasks that called 
upon his time and thus he was able to devote all his energy to the office. This 
masculine independence was embodied in his deportment as much as being a question 
of legal status, a point made clear in McCormack and Braddick.36 Equally importantly 
his status placed social distance between himself and his dependents.  
It is often argued that the stipulation that the constable had to live in the same 
area as those he policed would have made his task difficult as he would have had to 
face them on a daily basis and be subject to intimidation and reprisal; however this 
fails to take into account that according to the ideal the constable would live in the 
area, but not mix with or be an associate of the common people. The constable, as a 
member of the gentry or yeomanry, in theory at least, could use his social status and 
influence to command the respect and obedience of his inferiors, whom he should be 
used to dealing with in the manner of master and servant or patron and client. The 
gentleman was head of the household, which in the eighteenth century was conceived 
in terms much broader than the nuclear family. Wife, children, relations, servants and 
employees were conceived of part of the household and the father governed it as a 
patriarch. Only he was truly independent and being in any of the dependent roles 
defined the subject in a feminine role, even if they were male, and it was considered 
that the dependence of a servant involved a temporary sacrifice of liberty to some 
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extent.37 Implicit in the property qualifications and suggestions about the social status 
of constables were the twin assumptions that the tasks of policing would be carried 
out by gentlemen over the lower orders, with whom he would be familiar but not on 
the terms of friendship or personal interest or partiality, and that the task would be 
possible because of natural authority of the independent man over these dependents. 
Equally important, of course, would be his developed capacity for judgement and his 
legal knowledge. 
But even in the early eighteenth century such ideals were just that in London, 
where the practice of using paid deputies for constables was widespread.38 Over the 
century this process gathered pace as the number of gentlemen serving as constables 
and magistrates continued to decline.39 The consequence of this was that the bodies 
responsible for London’s policing gradually evolved a paid, hierarchical system to 
compensate for their absence. Using either paid deputies for constables or even 
permanent paid police officers, often organised hierarchically, provided a solution to 
the problem of gentry absenteeism and made the conduct of policing duty more 
reliable, but it also created conceptual problems for the political imagination of the 
period. When these bodies of men were under the control of the parish council or the 
manor then the problem was simply one of the status of the paid constables and their 
distance from their fellows, but when, in the late eighteenth century, the Executive in 
London intervened and attempted to draw policing under its own authority, this 







The central problem faced by the authorities responsible for policing was not that of 
specialization identified by Pocock, but negligence by those whose virtue was 
supposed to ensure the moral conduct of the people and thus the liberty of the state.40 
Specialization was actually an instrumental solution to the problem of negligence, 
which was perfectly acceptable provided that the paid specialist could be inculcated 
with the values of virtù. Indeed, it is clear that payment of peace or ‘police’ officers as 
they were increasingly being called, gave the authorities a new tool with which to 
govern these men. The practical problem caused by the shift to paid policing, carried 
out by salaried deputies and an increasing reliance on paid watchmen to carry out the 
tasks of constables as well as their own role, was that this task was generally carried 
out by men of a much lower social status than the authors of the preceding tracts 
imagined to be ideal. On the one hand this was beneficial, as the threat to dismiss an 
officer or to fine him for misconduct was a much greater deterrent to those who 
needed the work than it had been to the man of leisure: Colquhoun is quite explicit in 
identifying that in fact payment might actually be a lever of greater vigilance rather 
than corruption: ‘From those, who serve in their own right, it is to be feared that little 
more can be expected than what is indispensably necessary’ and it is ‘from [paid] 
police officers and respectable substitutes only, that vigour and energy in the 
ramifications of duty are to be looked for’.41 But another consequence of this was that 
these men did not possess the characteristics thought ideal for government or the 
‘natural’ authority of social status and they were not distanced from the people they 
were policing. This latter subject was clearly stated as late as the 1830s in the context 
of the un-reformed rural constabulary: ‘Even when suited in other respects to the 
employment, his [the constable’s] efficiency is always in a great manner impaired by 
the nature of his position with regard to those among whom he is called upon to act. 
  
14 
Belonging to their class, and brought into constant contact with them by his ordinary 
occupations, he is embarrassed in the discharge of his duty by considerations of 
personal safety, interest or feeling, and by an anxiety to retain the good will of his 
neighbour’.42 
The response of the authorities responsible for policing London is well known. 
Between 1735 and 1774 a series of acts were passed enabling various parishes to 
establish a nightly watch, paid for by the community. Elaine Reynolds has detailed 
the way in which the authorities attempted to establish the character and physical 
fitness of the watchmen through references and age limits and tried to enforce their 
attention to duty through surveillance and discipline and financial incentives.43 By the 
time Patrick Colquhoun wrote on the office of Constable in 1803, the salaried police 
officer was already a significant presence on the streets of London. Colquhoun was 
one of the first authors to deal explicitly with the subject of salaried constabulary 
deputies and watchmen and his work casts interesting light on the practical 
developments in police organization. Colquhoun estimated that in 1802 there were 
832 constables serving in London, Westminster, Holborn, Finsbury, Tower Hamlets 
and Southwark, of whom 330 were substitutes. Added to this were 213 stipendiary 
officers established at the seven police offices created by the Middlesex Justices Act, 
the Thames Police Office and Bow Street patrols and officers and there were therefore 
563 paid peace officers in the Metropolis. ‘Thus it would seem’, he wrote, ‘that the 
imperious necessity arising from the present state of society and manners has rendered 
it impossible to execute the duties assigned to constables in large and opulent 
communities, without resorting to stipendiary officers to a certain extent, and hence 
the propriety is obvious of selecting fit and able men, and such as are qualified 
according to law’.44 In other words the paid police officer should be selected and 
  
15 
managed so that he fulfil the same qualifications as his unpaid successors. Colquhoun 
stressed the necessity of ability, intelligence, prudence, probity and discretion in the 
officers. Most importantly, from our perspective, he stressed that through their estates 
they should be independent in order to act in the public interest.45 ‘It is of the utmost 
consequence to society’ he wrote ‘that they should be men of good moral character, 
and, in a certain degree, respectable’. He considered that the men should be offered 
enough money to attract those who were intelligent, but had simply fallen on hard 
times and that they wanted men ‘who would devote their time and attention to the 
various duties of the office, and execute the same with zeal, accuracy and probity’.46 
The ideals of temperance, prudence and probity were central to Ciceronian definitions 
of the ideal governor and have been identified as central to the Machiavellian problem 
of maintaining the free state.47 
But despite increasing mechanisms for control of the watchmen many parishes 
were still reliant on the vigilance of constables to enforce them and there was 
agitation for reform of the entire system of supervision. This caused considerable 
controversy in London when in 1785 an attempt was made to draw these paid officers 
under the authority of the Home Secretary. This prompted accusations that such 
salaried police officers controlled by the government would constitute a standing 
army. 
Writing in defence of such measures was Sir William Blizzard, a former 
Wilksite, a member of the Honourable Artillery Company that was active in 
suppressing the Gordon Riots, surgeon to the Magdalene and London hospitals and 
founder of the latter’s medical school and acquaintance of Jonas Hanway, working 
with him in the Marine Society. In anticipation of the Police Bill in 1785 Blizzard 
argued that ‘VICE foretells a nation’s certain fall’ and ‘That nation must be in great 
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danger, in which lawless men constitute a considerable part of the community’.48 
Blizzard frequently speaks of crime in terms of vice and ‘corruption’ and the solution, 
he argues at regular intervals, is for more ‘active virtue’ in the nation. He explicitly 
argues against common fears that the creation of a system of police would be 
equivalent to a standing army: ‘although Englishmen will ever, I trust, abhor the 
interposition of the military in the civil department of government, when not 
absolutely necessary, yet it does not follow that this remark might not be usefully 
applied when the services of armed citizens should be required’.49 Blizzard is 
explicitly defining police officers as citizen-soldiers who were not only acceptable, 
but in the Machiavellian neo-classical scheme were vital to the maintenance of liberty 
because they were outside the power of the tyrant.50 Blizzard argued that according to 
the ancient law of the kingdom it was seen ‘not only as a right, but as a duty; for all 
the subjects of the realm, who are able to bear arms, are bound to be ready, at all 
times, to assist the sheriff, and other civil magistrates, in the execution of the laws and 
the preservation of the public peace’. Their task, then, was to ‘strengthen the civil 
power’ and to be ‘at all times prepared for a vigorous and effectual discharge of their 
duty, as citizens’.51 It is clear that Blizzard saw a government-controlled force as 
capable of being described in these terms and he explicitly praised ‘a minister, 
virtuous as well as able and active’, presumably Pitt or Dundas.52 
But this was a London-specific problem and the dynamics of the emergence of 
the Metropolitan Police are well described elsewhere.53 Rather than dwell on the 
unusual situation which saw paid police forces drawn under the control of the 
Executive, I will explore the construction of paid forces in Manchester, which were 
under no threat of being brought under such control, were not opposed with the 
rhetoric of a standing army, and yet which implemented very similar structures of 
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governance to its London counterpart. This suggests that not only can we not accept 
the idea that the formation of a particular mode of constabulary subjectivity was 
necessary to ward of accusations of a gendarmerie, we cannot accept this as 
completely explanatory of the process taking place in London. 
1792 saw the establishment of a Police Commission in Manchester, a general 
body for the government of order in the town, one of whose responsibilities was 
regulation of the watch. The reorganization of the various committees in 1828-9, 
before the Metropolitan Police began operation on 29 September 1829, demonstrates 
very clearly that the kind of developments described by Reynolds for late eighteenth-
century London, were also common in other cities, albeit emerging as they 
experienced the problems of urban transformation somewhat later. On 7 November 
1828 the watch committee resolved not to appoint anyone over 50 or pensioned as a 
watchman, nor to appoint anyone ‘who does not belong to Manchester’. The 
watchman’s name was to be entered in a book ‘with the particulars of his good or bad 
conduct described at length, his age, family and residence’. The men were then 
inspected and accompanied on their rounds by ‘overlookers’.54  
In order to establish the best possible system for Manchester the Police 
Commission sent delegates to Birmingham, Edinburgh and Glasgow to examine their 
systems of police. The Birmingham police had no limits on the age or occupation of 
their watchmen, although they were required to live in their parish, but they inspected 
the watchmen once a year, dismissing all those considered unfit or unworthy of 
confidence. They also had regulations enabling them to reward old watchmen and a 
system of fines on publicans to prevent the watchmen drinking on duty. The 
regulations of the Lamp and Watch Committee defined the hours of service of the 
men and their duties and threatened fines or dismissal for those found asleep, drunk 
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talking on duty or otherwise neglecting his post.55 Glasgow, visited on 19 June 1829, 
took no men over the age of 45. There was no periodic inspection but the 
Superintendent was responsible for ensuring the efficiency of the men and could give 
a pension to those rendered unfit through service. As well as the usual regulations for 
the watchmen, the senior police officers were instructed that they ‘must be extremely 
attentive to sobriety and temperance, active and diligent in the discharge of his duty 
and maintain on all occasions a calm, civil, and obliging, but firm and steady conduct, 
not suffering himself to be biased in the execution of his duty’.56 
Drawing upon their experiences in the various towns they had investigated, the 
Manchester watch department also drew up a list of regulations for the government of 
their officers’ conduct.57 They were to be civil and temperate in their conduct, ‘on the 
one hand not to interfere with that which does not concern him, and on the other, not 
to permit anything to be neglected which it is his duty to notice. He must be firm and 
determined in the discharge of his duty, but, at the same time careful not to make use 
if unnecessary violence’.58 As soon as he was appointed he had to give up every other 
employment and attend his office whenever required. This meant that he would not be 
distracted by other work, nor would his business interests clash with those of his 
police duty. Neither he nor his wife should own a pub or sell liquor, nor should he 
drink on duty or take any gifts from the inhabitants.59 This meant that there was far 
less likelihood of the watchman finding himself in a compromising position, open to 
blackmail over neglect of duty or liable to accusations of taking bribes.  
The watchman was to remember that ‘there is no qualification more 
indispensable to a Police Officer than perfect command of temper, never suffering 
himself to be moved in the highest degree’, indeed ‘if he do his duty in a quiet and 
determined manner, such conduct will probably induce well disposed bystanders to 
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assist him’. In order to stimulate ‘an active, steady, and faithful discharge of duty’ 
they would be provided with rewards for merit, but ‘none will be suffered to continue 
on the establishment who are inactive and who do not, on all occasions, shew a 
marked degree of attention and spirit in the service’.60 The Watch Committee stressed 
that they would be assessed only on the performance of their duty and there could be 
no hope of intercession from a patron: ‘It has been the constant aim of your 
Committee to impress upon the men the responsibility of their situation and to shew 
them that they have nothing but their own good conduct to depend upon, and they are 
fully aware that no personal intercession can screen them from the effects of 
delinquency’.61 As for the senior officers, they were later instructed to be extremely 
mindful of their unique situation, they ‘being exposed to strong temptation, held out 
to them by depraved or interested parties, who will be the first to expose their 
compromise of independence and effect their ruin. Integrity, sobriety, intelligence, a 
systematic correctness in business, civility and humanity are the leading qualities of a 
good Police Officer’.62 
If these are compared to the regulations for the Metropolitan Police (which the 
Manchester Commission explicitly drew upon) the resemblance is striking. The 
Metropolitan Police were principally governed by the separation of the police 
institutions from the political process and patronage. Home Secretary Robert Peel’s 
only concrete recommendation on the establishment of the force known afterwards as 
the ‘Peelers’ was that ‘all nominated for employment in the Police, as well original 
nominations, as promotions from minor stations, should depend exclusively upon the 
character, qualifications, and services of the persons selected’.63 At the same time the 
officers and men were, even where normally eligible, excluded from the franchise in 
order to prevent accusations of party-political bias. This, along with the salary, meant 
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that it was in theory difficult to manipulate individual policemen, particularly the 
higher-ranking officers, with bribes or offers of political preferment. They also 
attempted to establish the temperate, manly conduct considered essential for the 
officers to possess authority. In the General Instructions of the Metropolitan Police 
the constable was instructed to ‘devote his whole time to the Police Service’, he 
should not take money from anyone without the permission of the Commissioners and 
he should not be in debt.64 He was, like his Mancunian counterpart, to be dependent 
on no-one and free from potential manipulation. The constable was to be completely 
sober and well-dressed, should not enter any house or pub except in the pursuit of his 
duty, should be polite and civil to all members of the public and must be temperate, 
yet act with decision and boldness.65 The values of command of the temper and 
decisive action were the definition of moral masculinity. These values were enforced 
and transmitted by dismissing those men unable to conform to these ideals and 
promoting those who embodied them most successfully. 
The kind of masculinity established by these regulations was not, of course, 
only a question of character, it was also a question of physique. The recruitment 
practices of the various forces contributed directly to the establishment of a muscular 
police presence. Recruits to the Metropolitan Police had to be fit men between the 
ages of 18 and 35 and over five feet seven inches in height, above average for the 
time. All men were given a medical inspection on recruitment and those whose chest 
size was less than a certain proportion of their height, or who were unable to lift basic 
weights, were rejected. There were various stipulations as to appearance with some 
forces allowing only clean-shaven men, some beards, a great symbol of nineteenth-
century masculinity. In the Maidstone borough force it was actually compulsory for 
the men to have whiskers.66  
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The Chief Constable of the Manchester borough police, introduced over the 
period 1839-42 replacing the Police Commission, was particularly concerned with the 
physique of his force. He discovered that the Dublin City police derived great power 
‘from the size and strength of the men who average nearly 5 feet 11 inches in height, 
they possess a great advantage in putting down street disturbances, indeed it is assured 
by the Officers of the Force that many parties who would with men of their own size 
not to be taken into custody quietly, give themselves up immediately to the large sized 
and powerful men feeling satisfied that it would be useless to resist’.67 In fact the 
physical presence of the police on the streets was considered a great deterrent to 
disorder in general. In Manchester itself the Chief Constable was informed by his 
superintendents, most of whom had served in the old police before the borough force, 
that ‘in former times, when the police constables were not placed on duty in the 
streets, broils frequently took place from the want of some one near at hand to 
suppress the affrays in their commencement’.68 The result was often that the 
constables had to use their cutlasses to suppress the riot and on some occasions had to 
call for military assistance. The physical presence of these strong men on the streets, 
then, was one aspect of the preventative nature of the new police. Equally, the 
numerical presence of these forces on the streets was significant. Paid watch and 
police systems greatly increased the numbers of men patrolling the streets and after 
1829 in London and 1830 in Manchester all these officers had the increased legal 
authority of a constable. 
Throughout the nineteenth century the police authorities actively sought to 
promote the masculine physicality of their officers by introducing an array of 
competitive sports that emphasised manliness, character and camaraderie following 
the public school model. The homo-social environment was promoted by building 
  
22 
large-scale dormitory and barrack accommodation for the officers to live in, by 
ensuring that the hours of police work meant that the men could only socialise with 
one another, and by encouraging the practice of manly sports such as rugby and 
boxing, football, cricket and athletics. The aim of this was to make the men into 
career officers, to attach them permanently to the force and more importantly, to 




In this chapter I have argued that the transition to a paid system of policing does not 
represent the abandonment of the idea that good government and even the free state 
depended upon the public activity of energetic men to maintain them. The idea that 
good laws required good, active men to execute them remained, what changed was 
the social background of the constable and the mechanism that ensured the 
engagement of these men in public life. Paid policing can be said to represent the 
institutionalization of independence, but this does, of course, result in a significant 
transformation in its nature replacing one kind of public man with another. Ironically 
it was precisely the financial, propertied independence of the gentry and the yeomanry 
that allowed them to be negligent in their duties towards government of the 
community, rendering them immune from the impact of the fines levied on non-
service or able to pay deputies to serve in their stead; real independence here led to 
negligence. Equally ironically it was the ‘necessity’ of the lower orders that meant 
that they could be compelled to be active through a system of payment, fines and 
rewards, which they could not so easily afford to ignore; real dependence here led to 
activity. At the same time this dependence on payment and reward and particularly 
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the threat of fines meant that it was also possible for the police authorities to 
encourage men not usually considered suitable for wielding public authority to abide 
by the Ciceronian ideals set out for the governor in the traditional definitions of 
constabulary duty. But this independent, temperate, prudent manliness which 
legitimized intervention in public conduct was also backed up by a new kind of 
manliness, a powerful physical presence produced by selection of particular physical 
types from amongst the working population, creating a powerful combination of 
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